ANIMAL SACRIFICE, CULTURAL
RIGHTS
Comments on the 16
September 2012 Discussion, Batticaloa
Dr S.Jeyasankar has asked me to comment on the issue of cultural
rightsin relation to animal sacrifice: a task I have found both extremely
interesting and very difficult! Talking about cultural rights is still a very
contentious and complex area of human rights and I have realised there are
still many unresolved issues in my own mind regarding how I think the concepts
of “culture” and “rights” need to be thought about and brought together. What I
propose in this piece of writing, therefore, is just a few preliminary comments
that come out ofa discussion that took place on 16th September 2012
between local traditional priests, human rights activists, professionals and
cultural practitioners in Batticaloa.
As we know, the frequent criticism made of human rights is that it is a ‘western concept’ that has little to say about the experiences of people in various other parts of the world. On the one hand this is an argument that I think has often been cynically used by particular elites to reinforce their economic, social and political power. On the other, as the issue of cultural rights demonstrates, there is a very genuine aspect to this criticism that needs to be taken into account. Certainly there are very significant shortcomings in the human rights framework when attempting to engage with belief systems and practices that differ significantly from those associated with Western, secular, liberal “Enlightenment” values. It is precisely for this reason that groups such as coalitions of Indigenous Peoples around the world have been working so hard to “decolonise” human rights frameworks and language and seeking recognition of some collective or group rights.Even in the West, there has been an increasing recognition that individuals often cannot be separated from their particular collective cultural context. As a result, to talk about the protection of human rights necessarily involves protecting both the individual rights of a person andensuring that the community to which they belong is allowed to flourish and support its members. There are however a number of factors which make this extremely difficult.
Let us first of all identify what we mean by cultural rights as I
think that this will demonstrate where some of the difficulties and tensions
lie. When talking about cultural rights, I see at least three different
dimensions that need to be treated separately. First of all there is the legal
dimension and I will address this one first as to my mind it is the most
straightforward.
Cultural Rights as Legal Rights
Within international human rights law there is a recognition of the
right to culture as a human right. This is contained within both the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Article 27) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 15). Article 2 of the Genocide
Convention also prohibits the deliberate destruction of any culture.
So too the United Nation’s cultural and educational organisation,
UNESCO has recognised that each culture in the world contains value and
deserves respect as part of the common heritage of humanity. Meanwhile the UN Declaration
on the Right to Development interprets development as including not only
economic but also social, political and cultural development.
However, the scope and meaning of this right to culture remains very
vague and ambiguous. This is partly because the law traditionally has not been
able to engage with concepts of culture: it has generally failed to recognise
that law develops within particular cultural contexts and that law itself has a
culture. As a result, cultural rightshave largely been neglected by
‘mainstream’ human rights organisations.
There is another tricky aspect to this right: how should it be
balanced against the rights of individuals? The human rights framework has been
about setting the individual human being as the central figure of concern: are
there situations in which it is not
in the best interest of an individual for the rights of a collective to be
recognised? This is an issue which has frequently been brought up in relation
to women’s rights. As many feminists around the world have pointed out, “culture”
and “tradition” have all too often been invoked (often selectively) to justify
the subordination and oppression of women. It is for this reason that in 1995 the
Declaration of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing confirmed the
importance of combatting all discriminatory,
harmful, and coercive traditional practices.
In the context of animal sacrifice, animal rights activists rightly
ask: is it acceptable to inflict suffering on a living creature that has had no
say in whether it is forced to participate in the particular cultural practice?
How do that individual creature’s rights to dignity and protection from harm
get balanced with the rights of a community practice its rituals? Moreover,
what about the possible health and safety concerns raised by the continuation
of such practices?
To my mind, the answers to these questions do not lie in a legal
solution. As we have seen, in the recent case that was brought before the Sri
Lankan courts regarding a proposed ritual sacrifice in Chilaw, various
different legal standards were cited: from the fundamental rights of religious
minorities to practice their religion (Articles 10 and 14 of the Sri Lankan
Constitution), to the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals legislation as well as
standards relating to health, safety and the animal slaughter profession. Each
of these may have potential merit but also demonstrate that the issue is not
only one of law but of both politics and ethics.
Cultural Rights as Politics
This takes me to the second dimension I wanted to discuss. As the
recent case in Sri Lanka demonstrates, this is not a purely legal
discussion. While some may genuinely be
concerned about the well-being of the animals in question, a number of others
are clearly seeking to gain some political mileage out of the issue. As Dr.S.
Jeyasankar and others have pointed out, many of the most vocal critics are not
themselves vegetarian. Nor have they been equally outspoken and indignant about
the conditions within which animals are kept and slaughtered for consumption or
the plight of many captive and stray animals roaming the streets of towns and
villages across the country. I would add here, many of these figures have also
seemed less than concerned by the suffering and senseless violence experienced
by many human beings: sometimes as a result of these very figures’ intolerant
rhetoric.
In recognising this, I would argue that part of the issue with
cultural rights – and indeed this is true of many different aspects of human
rights – is the political dimension of the debate. It is about power and who
decides what is acceptable and what is ‘barbaric’.
It is here that I can also say I am somewhat uncomfortable with the
concept of cultural rights. This is because to my mind, all rightsinvolve a cultural dimension. Yet cultural rights are
generally only invoked when speaking about minorities, as if the dominant group
does not have a culture. This allows for the dominant group to establish its
behaviour, views and practices as the norm against which all others are
evaluated. To redress the power imbalance I think that rather than us invoking
the cultural rights of marginalised minorities we need to de-stabilise the
dominant group’s cultural assumptions. To point out that this is about a
conflict between different – and generally equally defensible - cultural positions.
The Philosophical and Ethical Dimensions of Animal Sacrifice and
Cultural Rights
In recognising that particular political factions are seeking to
gain mileage out of this issue, I do not want to completely dismiss the debate.
I think it is an important discussion and as I mentioned above, I think there
is some merit to some of the criticisms particularly in relation to the concern
regarding the suffering of the animals involved. Just because George Bush
cynically invoked the idea of “protecting women’s rights” to justify the
invasion of Afghanistan does not mean that we should not pay attention to the
concerns that many Afghani women have raised about the denial of their basic
human rights by their own leaders. Rather, I think it requires us to develop a
more complex and sensitive approach to analysing how cultural difference and
individual rights interact with each other.
In the context of animal sacrifice, what I find most interesting and
challenging is the philosophical dimension. The decision to brand the rituals
as ‘barbaric slaughter’ is not only political. It also raises interesting
philosophical regarding what we understand to be ‘progress’, ‘development’,
‘civilisation’ and what we deem to be acceptable and unacceptable suffering.
The anthropologist TalalAsad has written about this in the context of colonial
and post-colonial discourses of torture. Asad points out that while British
colonial administrators in India (and indeed in Sri Lanka) branded various
traditional forms of punishment ‘barbaric’ and backward, they had no problem
using corporal punishment (including the death penalty) themselves. This is
because according to their logic, the punishment they used was to “civilise”
the population and was therefore a necessary evil to achieve progress.
To my mind, the debate around animal sacrifice here in Sri Lanka
currently replicates a classic colonial mentality. Many do not concern
themselves with the conditions within which animals slaughtered for consumption
are kept or killed because they see this as acceptable, even necessary suffering. Meanwhile the assumption is that traditional,
ritual practices – because they seemingly do not follow the Enlightenment
principles of rationality, secularism and reason – are inherently “barbaric”
and backward. This is without any real effort to understand the particular
logic and perceived value of these practices to those involved.
At the same time, sometimes defenders of cultural rights just
blindly endorse any traditional practice. I find this position patronising and
annoying in the extreme. Firstly it is overly romanticised and nostalgic.
Things have changed and some practices have died off for very good reason! My
great grandmother was denied any education and married off as a teenager while
I was encouraged to study, travel, experience life and see myself as equal to
any man: these are changes in my family and society that I am very grateful
for!
There is also another problematic dimension to this type of
automatic defence of cultural practices. It contains an implicit assumption
that while modern practices are based on reasoning that can stand up to and be
defended against criticism, these ‘quaint’ traditional practices are not solid
enough to allow for any criticism or interrogation! This is not respecting
other cultures, it is “protecting” them which also means treating them as
weaker and more fragile than our own.
This leads me to conclude that it is only by being willing to
re-examine our assumptions about what “progress” and “civilisation” mean that
we will be able to productively engage with the debate about animal sacrifice.
Doing this means we do not have to adopt a simple position of either endorsing
or criticising the practice. Rather, it would allow us to meaningfully debate
the pros and cons: see if there are points of compromise (can the animal be
killed in a way that causes less suffering? Or can a live animal be substituted
for something else?), see if we can respectfully agree to disagree. The goal
for the debate on animal sacrifice should not be to decide whether it is right
or wrong but rather to create a mutually respectful space within which
different views can be heard and engaged with and all members of communities
for whom the practice is important to be able to decide how and why their
community changes.
Kiran Grewal
Department of Sociology and Social Policy
University of Sydney
30 September 2012.
