Friday, October 12, 2012

ANIMAL SACRIFICE, CULTURAL RIGHTS


ANIMAL SACRIFICE, CULTURAL RIGHTS
Comments on the 16 September 2012 Discussion, Batticaloa

Dr S.Jeyasankar has asked me to comment on the issue of cultural rightsin relation to animal sacrifice: a task I have found both extremely interesting and very difficult! Talking about cultural rights is still a very contentious and complex area of human rights and I have realised there are still many unresolved issues in my own mind regarding how I think the concepts of “culture” and “rights” need to be thought about and brought together. What I propose in this piece of writing, therefore, is just a few preliminary comments that come out ofa discussion that took place on 16th September 2012 between local traditional priests, human rights activists, professionals and cultural practitioners in Batticaloa.

As we know, the frequent criticism made of human rights is that it is a ‘western concept’ that has little to say about the experiences of people in various other parts of the world. On the one hand this is an argument that I think has often been cynically used by particular elites to reinforce their economic, social and political power. On the other, as the issue of cultural rights demonstrates, there is a very genuine aspect to this criticism that needs to be taken into account. Certainly there are very significant shortcomings in the human rights framework when attempting to engage with belief systems and practices that differ significantly from those associated with Western, secular, liberal “Enlightenment” values. It is precisely for this reason that groups such as coalitions of Indigenous Peoples around the world have been working so hard to “decolonise” human rights frameworks and language and seeking recognition of some collective or group rights.Even in the West, there has been an increasing recognition that individuals often cannot be separated from their particular collective cultural context. As a result, to talk about the protection of human rights necessarily involves protecting both the individual rights of a person andensuring that the community to which they belong is allowed to flourish and support its members. There are however a number of factors which make this extremely difficult.

Let us first of all identify what we mean by cultural rights as I think that this will demonstrate where some of the difficulties and tensions lie. When talking about cultural rights, I see at least three different dimensions that need to be treated separately. First of all there is the legal dimension and I will address this one first as to my mind it is the most straightforward.

Cultural Rights as Legal Rights

Within international human rights law there is a recognition of the right to culture as a human right. This is contained within both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 27) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 15). Article 2 of the Genocide Convention also prohibits the deliberate destruction of any culture.

So too the United Nation’s cultural and educational organisation, UNESCO has recognised that each culture in the world contains value and deserves respect as part of the common heritage of humanity. Meanwhile the UN Declaration on the Right to Development interprets development as including not only economic but also social, political and cultural development.

However, the scope and meaning of this right to culture remains very vague and ambiguous. This is partly because the law traditionally has not been able to engage with concepts of culture: it has generally failed to recognise that law develops within particular cultural contexts and that law itself has a culture. As a result, cultural rightshave largely been neglected by ‘mainstream’ human rights organisations.

There is another tricky aspect to this right: how should it be balanced against the rights of individuals? The human rights framework has been about setting the individual human being as the central figure of concern: are there situations in which it is not in the best interest of an individual for the rights of a collective to be recognised? This is an issue which has frequently been brought up in relation to women’s rights. As many feminists around the world have pointed out, “culture” and “tradition” have all too often been invoked (often selectively) to justify the subordination and oppression of women. It is for this reason that in 1995 the Declaration of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing confirmed the importance of combatting all discriminatory, harmful, and coercive traditional practices.

In the context of animal sacrifice, animal rights activists rightly ask: is it acceptable to inflict suffering on a living creature that has had no say in whether it is forced to participate in the particular cultural practice? How do that individual creature’s rights to dignity and protection from harm get balanced with the rights of a community practice its rituals? Moreover, what about the possible health and safety concerns raised by the continuation of such practices?

To my mind, the answers to these questions do not lie in a legal solution. As we have seen, in the recent case that was brought before the Sri Lankan courts regarding a proposed ritual sacrifice in Chilaw, various different legal standards were cited: from the fundamental rights of religious minorities to practice their religion (Articles 10 and 14 of the Sri Lankan Constitution), to the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals legislation as well as standards relating to health, safety and the animal slaughter profession. Each of these may have potential merit but also demonstrate that the issue is not only one of law but of both politics and ethics.


Cultural Rights as Politics

This takes me to the second dimension I wanted to discuss. As the recent case in Sri Lanka demonstrates, this is not a purely legal discussion.  While some may genuinely be concerned about the well-being of the animals in question, a number of others are clearly seeking to gain some political mileage out of the issue. As Dr.S. Jeyasankar and others have pointed out, many of the most vocal critics are not themselves vegetarian. Nor have they been equally outspoken and indignant about the conditions within which animals are kept and slaughtered for consumption or the plight of many captive and stray animals roaming the streets of towns and villages across the country. I would add here, many of these figures have also seemed less than concerned by the suffering and senseless violence experienced by many human beings: sometimes as a result of these very figures’ intolerant rhetoric.

In recognising this, I would argue that part of the issue with cultural rights – and indeed this is true of many different aspects of human rights – is the political dimension of the debate. It is about power and who decides what is acceptable and what is ‘barbaric’.

It is here that I can also say I am somewhat uncomfortable with the concept of cultural rights. This is because to my mind, all rightsinvolve a cultural dimension. Yet cultural rights are generally only invoked when speaking about minorities, as if the dominant group does not have a culture. This allows for the dominant group to establish its behaviour, views and practices as the norm against which all others are evaluated. To redress the power imbalance I think that rather than us invoking the cultural rights of marginalised minorities we need to de-stabilise the dominant group’s cultural assumptions. To point out that this is about a conflict between different – and generally equally defensible - cultural positions.


The Philosophical and Ethical Dimensions of Animal Sacrifice and Cultural Rights

In recognising that particular political factions are seeking to gain mileage out of this issue, I do not want to completely dismiss the debate. I think it is an important discussion and as I mentioned above, I think there is some merit to some of the criticisms particularly in relation to the concern regarding the suffering of the animals involved. Just because George Bush cynically invoked the idea of “protecting women’s rights” to justify the invasion of Afghanistan does not mean that we should not pay attention to the concerns that many Afghani women have raised about the denial of their basic human rights by their own leaders. Rather, I think it requires us to develop a more complex and sensitive approach to analysing how cultural difference and individual rights interact with each other.

In the context of animal sacrifice, what I find most interesting and challenging is the philosophical dimension. The decision to brand the rituals as ‘barbaric slaughter’ is not only political. It also raises interesting philosophical regarding what we understand to be ‘progress’, ‘development’, ‘civilisation’ and what we deem to be acceptable and unacceptable suffering. The anthropologist TalalAsad has written about this in the context of colonial and post-colonial discourses of torture. Asad points out that while British colonial administrators in India (and indeed in Sri Lanka) branded various traditional forms of punishment ‘barbaric’ and backward, they had no problem using corporal punishment (including the death penalty) themselves. This is because according to their logic, the punishment they used was to “civilise” the population and was therefore a necessary evil to achieve progress.

To my mind, the debate around animal sacrifice here in Sri Lanka currently replicates a classic colonial mentality. Many do not concern themselves with the conditions within which animals slaughtered for consumption are kept or killed because they see this as acceptable, even necessary suffering.  Meanwhile the assumption is that traditional, ritual practices – because they seemingly do not follow the Enlightenment principles of rationality, secularism and reason – are inherently “barbaric” and backward. This is without any real effort to understand the particular logic and perceived value of these practices to those involved.

At the same time, sometimes defenders of cultural rights just blindly endorse any traditional practice. I find this position patronising and annoying in the extreme. Firstly it is overly romanticised and nostalgic. Things have changed and some practices have died off for very good reason! My great grandmother was denied any education and married off as a teenager while I was encouraged to study, travel, experience life and see myself as equal to any man: these are changes in my family and society that I am very grateful for!

There is also another problematic dimension to this type of automatic defence of cultural practices. It contains an implicit assumption that while modern practices are based on reasoning that can stand up to and be defended against criticism, these ‘quaint’ traditional practices are not solid enough to allow for any criticism or interrogation! This is not respecting other cultures, it is “protecting” them which also means treating them as weaker and more fragile than our own.

This leads me to conclude that it is only by being willing to re-examine our assumptions about what “progress” and “civilisation” mean that we will be able to productively engage with the debate about animal sacrifice. Doing this means we do not have to adopt a simple position of either endorsing or criticising the practice. Rather, it would allow us to meaningfully debate the pros and cons: see if there are points of compromise (can the animal be killed in a way that causes less suffering? Or can a live animal be substituted for something else?), see if we can respectfully agree to disagree. The goal for the debate on animal sacrifice should not be to decide whether it is right or wrong but rather to create a mutually respectful space within which different views can be heard and engaged with and all members of communities for whom the practice is important to be able to decide how and why their community changes.


Kiran Grewal
Department of Sociology and Social Policy
University of Sydney

30 September 2012.